Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 30

Issue 3

Article 7

1980

Judicial Power over Contingent Fee Contracts: Reasonableness
and Ethics
Stephen F. Gladstone

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Stephen F. Gladstone, Judicial Power over Contingent Fee Contracts: Reasonableness and Ethics, 30 Case
W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 523 (1980)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol30/iss3/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

JUDICIAL POWER OVER CONTINGENT FEE
CONTRACTS: REASONABLENESS AND
ETHICS
Contingentfee contracts serve a valuablefunction in providingpotential claimants, unable to obtain traditionalfinancingfor legal representation,access to the
legal system Because of the specialrisks involved attorneys may reap a windfall.
This potentialabuse can trigger the equitablepower of the judiciary to supervise
these agreements. This Note discussestheproperscope of this
fpower in terms ofthe
standardsused to judge the propriety of contingentfee arrangements. The author
examines the reasonablenessstandardused by a majority ofcourts andfinds that an
approachwhichfocuses on the ethics ofthe contractispreferableto avoid the confusion and doctrinaldifficulties inherent in the reasonablenessanalysis.
INTRODUCTION

CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACTS' between attorneys and clients are

an established part of the practice of law. These arrangements
have received the approval of the American Bar Association2 as
well as many state bars because such contracts provide the only
economical and practical means for some persons to pursue legal
claims.' Though the use of the contingent fee contract is established, disputes often arise when
attempts are made to enforce or
4
court.
in
contracts
these
limit
Courts in most jurisdictions have held that there is an inherent
equitable power vested in a trial court to pass upon the propriety
of counsel fees in connection with any matter before it.5 This
1. A contingent fee contract has been defined as:
A contract between an attorney ... and a client wherein the former agrees to
represent the latter as the latter's attorney ... in the commencement and prosecution of a suit on behalf of the latter for a fee amounting to a certain percent of
the amount of the judgment obtained in the action for the client, no charge to be
made by the attorney against the client in the event the action is not successful in
behalf of the client.
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 260 (3d ed. 1969).
2. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 2-20 (1976).
3. 1 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES 84 (1973); Case Comment, Walker v. Telex Corp.:
Contingent Fee-PresumptiveValue of a Benefit, 3 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 759, 764 (1979)
('The historical justification for contingency fee contracts was to enable the penniless client
to obtain compensation.").
4. "In some cases, the issue of attorneys' fees becomes more complicated and involves more attorney time than the underlying lawsuit." Berger, CourtAwardedAttorneys'
Fees. What is 'Reasonable" , 126 U. PA. L. REv. 281,292 (1977). For example, in Kiser v.
Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311, 1316-17 (D.D.C. 1973), nearly half of the papers filed involved
attorneys' fees issues; see notes 39-40 infra and accompanying text.
5. E.g., Schlesinger v. Teitelbaum, 475 F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,414 U.S.
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view, however, has not been universally accepted. For example,
in Thatcher v. Industrial Commission,6 the Utah Supreme Court
challenged this general rule stating:
[W]e are not aware of any power in the judiciary to fix or regulate attorney's fees. We do not think it can be inferred from the
power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure nor from
the power to provide for the examination, licensing or regulanor from the auxiliary power
tion of admission to the bar ..
to discipline attorneys as officers of the court for unprofessional
,

conduct. .

.

. [T]he attorney's fee is left to agreement between

the attorney and his client subject to the right of the court to
discipline the attorney where the fee charged is unconscionable,
or advantage is taken of the ignorance of the client. . ..

We

must therefore conclude that the judiciary does not regulate attorneys in the sense that it supervises them in their office transactions and that the matter of fixing fees is generally a matter of
agreement.7
In passing on the propriety of the fees garnered by contingent
fee contracts, courts have recognized a unique feature of such arrangements-the risk of no recovery for the client and thus no fee
for the attorney. Consequently, courts have enforced contracts
where the fee is greater than the value of the services performed.'
Despite seemingly favorable treatment of the attorney's interest in these contracts, there is some "judicial and legislative suspicion" of such contracts, a belief that attorneys may be tempted to
take advantage of their clients.9 Accordingly, there is a tendency
among courts to construe any ambiguity in a fee contract liberally
in favor of the client," consistent with the general rule that an
1111 (1973) ("in its supervisory power over the members of its bar, a court has jurisdiction
of certain activities of such members, including the charges of contingent fees"); Baumrin
v. Cournoyer, 448 F. Supp. 225, 228 (D. Mass. 1978) (inherent equitable power vested in
district court to judge the reasonableness of counsel fees in any case before it); Jersey Land
and Dev. Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 48, 54 (D.N.J. 1972), rev'don other grounds,
539 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1976) (a court has an "inherent equitable power to pass upon the
).
reasonableness of counsel fees charged in connection with any matter before it....
One commentator has noted that "the general view in all jurisdictions seems to be that this
right to make fee contracts is limited by the basic power of the courts to prevent unprofes... F. MAcKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL
sional conduct by its officers.
SERVICEs 43 (1964).
6. 115 Utah 568, 207 P.2d 178 (1949).
7. Id. at 574-75, 207 P.2d at 181.
8. F. MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 62. For a different view of modem contingent
fee contracts, See Case Comment, supra note 3 ("Contingency fee contracts today are not
formed as simple, salaried propositions, but are in essence an application of risk capital
seeking higher returns").
9. F. MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 44.
10. See note 5 supra.
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ambiguous contract is construed against its drafter."
Such modification of these arrangements poses significant
problems of legitimacy. Since a court can intervene in the contingent fee agreement only in extraordinary circumstances, 2 proper
articulation of the limits of judicial supervisory power in terms of
appropriate standards to review these agreements is necessary.
For the most part, courts have discussed such standards in terms
of the reasonableness of the fee gained in relation to the effort of
the attorney.13 Whether this reasonableness approach adequately
describes the proper scope of judicial authority is the focus of this
Note.
Interestingly, this issue may be complicated when a court has
statutory authority not merely to supervise a fee arrangement, but
to grant a fee award outright. A recent case of much notoriety,
Krause v. Rhodes (the Kent State case),' 4 serves as an example of
a situation where it is unclear whether the court was relying primarily on statutory authority to award attorneys' fees or on general supervisory authority in abrogating the applicable contingent
fee contracts. The oral opinion of the court' 5 noted its authority
to exercise discretion to set attorneys' fees pursuant to section 1988
of the Civil Rights Act.' 6 A subsequent oral ruling seemingly "reaffirmed" the grounds upon which the court had limited the fee
claims of counsel in the prior opinion.' 7 However, it could be argued, as appellee did,' 8 that in this latter opinion the court made
no mention of the statute but rather, specifically drew upon the
cases cited in its earlier opinion as the basis for its general supervisdry power. '9 Thus, the district court had retreated from any statutory basis for its decision and relied instead on its general
supervisory power.
This Note examines the development of the courts' general supervisory power over contingent fee agreements.2 ° Specifically,
the Note traces the growth of the "reasonableness" standard
11.

See Jersey Land and Dev. Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 48, 54 (D.N.J.

1972).
12. See notes 25-33 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 38-45 infra and accompanying text.
14. No. 70-544 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 1979) (settlement and dismissal order), appealdocketed, No. 79-3115 (6th Cir. March 9, 1979).
15. Krause v. Rhodes, No. 70-544 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 6, 1979) (oral opinion).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
17. Krause v. Rhodes, No. 70-544 (N.D. Ohio March 9, 1979) (oral ruling) at 2.
18. Brief for Appellee, Krause v. Rhodes, No. 70-544 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 1979).
19. Id. at 17 n.5.
20. See notes 38-48 infra and accompanying text.
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through case law. It focuses on the problems inherent in this standard-judicial arbitrariness, misuse of precedent, and confusion

of the issues2 '-and proposes an alternative approach which emphasizes the ethical relationship between attorney and client.2 2
Such an approach, this Note argues, not only avoids some of the
difficulties encountered with the reasonableness standard, but also
is more consistent with case law.23 Finally, to demonstrate the

utility of this alternative ethical approach, this Note applies it to
the exceptional circumstances of the Kent State case.24
I.

THE RESTRICTED RIGHT TO CONTRACT FOR A CONTINGENT
FEE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REASONABLENESS
STANDARD

A court, in the exercise of its supervisory power over attorneys
as officers of the court, generally determines the propriety of a
contingent fee contract.2 5 In other words, there is no "unrestricted
right to contract for a contingent fee."'26 Further, there are several
policy grounds which by virtue of special equitable circumstances
often dictate judicial intervention. One such policy, protection
28
of minors, compelled judicial intervention in Cappel v. Adams.
Cappel was an action for the wrongful death of a mother and personal injuries to a father resulting from carbon monoxide poisoning.29 The contingent fee contract between the father (on behalf
of himself and his children) and the attorney provided for a fee of
one-third of any recovery made through judgment or settlement.3
Upon actual settlement, however, the district court limited the attorney's share of the children's award to one fifth. 3' The attorney
contended on appeal that the court had interfered with the right of
attorney and client to establish attorney fees by mutual agreement
"without being restrained by the law."3 2 The Fifth Circuit noted,
21. See notes 49-59 infra and accompanying text.
22. See notes 49-77 infra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 60-77 infra and accompanying text.
24. See notes 78-90 infra and accompanying text.
25. Allen v. United States, 606 F.2d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 1979) (generally recognized
power of courts to deal with contingent fee contracts in the cases before them is "wellestablished"); see F. MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 43.
26. Recent Developments, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 242, 244 (1960).
27. Id.
28. 434 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1970).
29. Id. at 1279.
30. Id.
31. Id. The district court approved the one-third fee as to the father. Id.
32. Id. at 1280.
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however, that "the right to contract for a contingent fee has never
been thought to be unrestrained. . . [and that such contracts are]
especially subject to restriction when the client is a minor, largely
33
because of the obvious possibility of unfair advantage."
No matter how broadly one defines the right to contract-and
thus narrowly defines the right of judicial intervention-serious
questions remain regarding the scope of the power of a court to
interfere in the contractual relationship. One federal district
court, in United States v. 115.128 Acres of Land, More or Less in
Newark, N.J , set a definite limit: in the absence of fraud or
undue influence, courts should not set aside an attorney's contract
for contingent fees unless the fees are exhorbitant. 35 The same
court, twenty-one years later, stated the limits in a slightly different way:
This Court has the inherent equitable power to pass upon the
reasonableness of counsel fees charged in connection with any
matter before it, provided that the action of the Court does not
nullify or diminish the effectiveness of a valid contract volunta36
rily entered upon by parties of equal bargaining power.
Most federal courts have not felt their power to be so limited.
These courts have interpreted their power to extend well beyond
the spirit, if not the words, of limitation set forth in 115.128
37

Acres.

Starting from the premise, established in the seminal case of
Spilker v. Hankin,3 8 that contingent fee contracts are not to be
treated as ordinary contracts, courts have developed an analysis
which examines the reasonableness of the contract. For example,
in Kiser v. Miller,39 the court extended this notion of different, special treatment for contingent fee contracts. Emphasizing that the
Spilker rule was based on the fiduciary relationship of the parties,
the Kiser court, although discussing the reasonableness of the fee
in question, ruled that such contracts were "presumptively
void."'
33. Id.
34. 101 F. Supp. 796 (D.N.J. 1951).
35. Id. at 799.
36. Jersey Land and Dev. Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 48, 54 (D.N.J. 1972),
rev'don other grounds, 539 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1976).
37. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
38. 188 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
39. 364 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1973), mod#fedsub non, Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237
(D.C. Cir. 1974). See notes 62-67 infra and accompanying text.
40. 364 F. Supp. at 1319.
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In Dunn v. HK PorterCo. ,41 the court went even further. Acknowledging the special nature of contingent fee contracts, the
court noted that the ABA Canons ofProfessionalEthics had qualified the right of an attorney to enter into such agreements "with
the proviso that [the contracts] are subject to the 'supervision of
the courts, as to [their] reasonableness. 42 From this, the Dunn
court established a specific standard by which contracts were to be
judged-a standard that was arguably divorced from the fiduciary
principles inherent in the supervisory authority. Seemingly ignoring its true objective in monitoring contingent fee contracts, ie., to
eliminate overreaching, the court declared that a contract would
be struck down if the fee were merely found to be unreasonable.4 3
Such an approach was ratified in Allen v. United States,"
where the court noted that in determining the propriety or reasonableness of a contingent fee, "A court abuses its discretion if it
allows a fee without carefully considering the factors relevant to
fair compensation."4 5 Thus, from the suggestion that, because of
the fiduciary relationship of the parties, the court should treat contingent fee contracts with more care than ordinary contracts, an
analysis evolved which required a detailed inquiry into the reasonableness of the fee. Yet, such an analysis is imprecise.46 Not
only does the reasonableness standard serve as the cause for confusion with standards used in other contexts,4 7 but it also is an
inaccurate label for the analyses actually used by the courts.4 "
II.

THE PROBLEM WITH THE REASONABLENESS STANDARD:
THE CASE FOR THE ETHICAL APPROACH

A.

Reasonableness as a Confusing Standard

The approach taken by the court in Allen v. United States49
typifies the confusion engendered in resorting to the reasonableness standard when courts must decide the propriety of contingent
fee contracts. As noted, the Allen court required a careful consid41.
42.
(current
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

602 F.2d 1105 (3d Cir. 1979). See notes 68-77 infra and accompanying text.
602 F.2d at 1108 (citing Canon 13 of the ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics,
version ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR2-106 (A)(8) (1976)).
Id. at 1109.
606 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1979). See notes 49-55 infra and accompanying text.
606 F.2d at 435.
See notes 49-77 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 49-55 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 56-77 infra and accompanying text.
606 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1979).
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eration of the "factors relevant to fair compensation."5 Specifically, the court remanded the case to the district court with
direction to apply the widely approved list of factors for determining reasonable attorneys' fees articulated by the Fifth Circuit in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,Inc.5 Yet, in Johnson, the
court dealt with the determination of reasonable fees in connection with a statutory grant of authority to award sucli fees. 2 This
question is significantly different from a consideration of the propriety of a contingent fee.
The importance of this distinction was succinctly stated in
Co. v. Forster Manufacturing Co.
Farmington Dowel Products
53
(FarmingtonDowel!).
[Tliere is a difference in overall complexity between the court's
role in awarding a fee under section 4 [of the Clayton Act] and
in exercising its supervisory power over the bar. The first is
commonly exercised; the second is reserved for exceptional circumstances. The first requires the court to arrive at a figure
which it considers reasonable; the second requires it to arrive at
a figure which it considers the outer limit of reasonableness.
The first determination is made without reference to any prior
agreement between the parties; the second must take account of
the fact that an agreement, if freely made, is not lightly set
impact; a superviaside. A section 4 award has only economic
54
sory decision in an ethicaljudgment.
Thus, one problem with the reasonableness standard is that
courts may indiscriminately use cases and authority, which construe reasonableness in terms of a fair statutorily authorized
award, in the context of deciding whether the court may equitably
enforce a fee gained through agreement. Rather than mechanically following the law surrounding the word "reasonableness,"
50. Id.at 435. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
51. 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). The Allen court stated:
Johnson directs the court's attention to (1)the time and labor required in the case,
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented, (3) the skill required to
perform the necessary legal services, (4) the preclusion of other employment by
the lawyer due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee for similar work,
(6) the contingency of a fee, (7) the time pressures imposed in the case, (8) the
award involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer, (10) the "undesirability" of the case, (11) the nature and length
of the professional relationship between the lawyer and the client, and (12) the fee
awards made in similar cases.
606 F.2d at 436.
52. The Johnson court addressed the adequacy of an attorney fee award pursuant to
section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). 488 F.2d at 714.
53. 421 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1970).
54. Id.at 90 (emphasis added).

530
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courts must be aware that in the former situation guidelines may
be more strictly applied then in the latter situation.
Notably, the result in Allen was arguably correct, but for the
wrong reason. Instead of justifying application of the Johnson
statutory reasonableness criteria by reference to the court's general duty to supervise a contingent fee contract, the Allen court
may have validly relied on authority to determine fair compensation expressly given to the court by the agreement in question."
Such a situation could be likened more to an award of reasonable
fees under statutory authority than to an analysis of the outer limits of reasonableness.
Yet, absent such fortuitous circumstances, judicial application
of reasonableness standards derived from statutory authority to
contingent fee propriety issues without an appreciation of the different nature of these questions is incorrect and is inconsistent
with the proper scope of the court's power. Such a result may be
easily expected from resort to similar terms in differing contexts.
Reformulation of the standard in the contingent fee context to
portray more accurately the proper inquiry of the court and thus
the proper scope of the court's power is no doubt preferable.
B.

Reasonableness as an InaccurateStandard-The Ethical
Approach Revealed

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of a reasonableness standard is that it at once goes too far and not far enough. As noted
above, the reasonableness standard is seemingly separated from
the ethical bases of the right of judicial intervention in contingent
fee contracts.5 6 By requiring intervention absent any inquiry into
abuse, impropriety, or overreaching, 57 the reasonableness standard may interfere with a contract which accurately and appropriately assesses the risk involved. 58 Such a result may serve to
discourage future arrangements and hence prevent potential, legitimate claimants, unable to enter into traditional financial arrangements, from gaining access to legal services.
Another consequence of the separation of reasonableness from
the equitable principles of judicial supervisory power is that the
standard may prove insufficient. By examining factors such as the
55. The parties had agreed to "seek the guidance of the court in setting a fee not to
exceed 25%" of the benefits gained. 606 F.2d at 434.
56. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
57. See, e.g., note 51 supra.
58. See note 3 supra.
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efforts of the attorney (in terms of hours, hourly rate, difficulty of
the problem) and (perhaps) risk to the attorney,5 9 the reasonableness standard may omit other important considerations such as
how the contract was established, the sophistication of the parties,
and other indicia of the ethical propriety of the contract.
The propriety of the ethical approach, however, does not only
arise from the deficiencies of the reasonableness standard, but also
from the fact that such an approach is consistent with the analyses
actually employed by the courts. Although the Spilker line of
cases may lead to the conclusion that reasonableness is an acceptable standard to use in determining the propriety of contingent fee
contracts, 60 a closer examination reveals that courts, in fact, have
determined the ethical propriety of the fee, the attorney's conduct,
and other circumstances surrounding the contract and have discussed propriety in terms of reasonableness, inaccurately portraying the actual analysis used. This revelation is not profound;
judicial intervention is based, after all, on the court's equitable
power and on the special fiduciary relationship between the contracting parties. For example, in Spilker the court emphasized
that contingent fee contracts were not to be treated as ordinary
contracts where "a contract beneficial to the attorney is executed
long after the attorney-client relationship has commenced, when
the position of trust is well established, and the litigation is reach' 6
ing its culmination. '
That questions of the propriety of contingent fee contracts involve inquiry into the "ethics" of the contract is perhaps most
readily demonstrated in Kiser v. Miller.62 Kiser involved a class
action for recovery of retroactive pension benefits for retired coal
miners. 63 Contingent fee contracts were obtained after counsel actually knew the outcome of the case.' Although the court did
discuss the contract fee in terms of its reasonableness-finding it
to be excessive and not a "true reflection of a reasonable fee in this
suit" 6 - - the decision was based upon equitable considerations.
The court framed the issue as "whether the court can, in good
conscience, enforce a contract made with class members, who
59.
60.
61.
62.

See note 51 supra.
See notes 38-45 supra and accompanying text.
188 F.2d at 39.
364 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1973), modofedsub nom. Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237

(D.C. Cir. 1974).
63. Id. at 1313.
64. Id. at 1318-19.
65. Id. at 1317.
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more likely than not, lack sophistication, experience, and education to act understandingly and deal with their attorneys on an
equal basis at arms length."66 It decided that, in light of all the
circumstances, to allow counsel to benefit from the settlement
would be "inconsistent with the high duties of the legal profession
to assist the disadvantaged and the downtrodden .. ."67 Thus,
the Kiser court, implicitly judging the ethics of the formation of
the contract, struck down the arrangement.
In Dunn v. HK PorterCo. ,68 the court also judged the ethical
propriety of the contract, yet failed to adequately explain its analysis. This failure is particularly significant since Dunn facially
supports use of the reasonableness standard.6 9 In Dunn, a district
court refused to enforce a contingent fee contract involving a class
action which sought pension benefits.7 ° In reviewing the lower
court's ruling, the Third Circuit emphasized the duty imposed on
the courts by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). It noted that
this rule "imposes . . .a responsibility to protect the interests of
class members from abuse."'" In addition, the court realized that
this responsibility was enhanced when settlement funds were involved since an "adversarial relationship" developed between attorney and client due to the potential reduction in client award
caused by any increase in attorneys' fees.7 2
The appellate court noted that the district court's decision was
authorized even though "the district court made a specific finding
that the agreements were obtained without any impropriety and
[that there was] . . .very little empirical evidence suggesting a
wide-spread abuse of the fee system."7 3 This, when taken together
with the court's discussion of reasonableness of the contract seemingly indicated an abandonment of the ethics inquiry derived
from Spilker and Kiser. Since no impropriety had been found
and the contract could still be overturned, one could effectively
argue that the court had gone beyond an inquiry into possible
overreaching in determining reasonableness, and hence, the propriety of the contract.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
(3d Cir.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 1319.
Id. at 1320.
602 F.2d 1105 (3d Cir. 1979).
See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
Dunn v. H.K. Porter Co., 78 F.R.D. 41, 46 (E.D. Pa. 1977), vacated,602 F.2d 1105
1979).
602 F.2d at 1109.
Id.
Id.
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Yet, a determination of no impropriety and intervention in the
contract does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the ethical
inquiry was totally foresaken. First, the court articulated an obligation to look beyond the face of the contract.74 It directed an
inquiry into several "critical factors" which included the manner
into which the contract was entered, the status and sophistication
of the clients, the size of the award, and whether the fee would be
sufficient to encourage capable counsel in similar litigation in the
future." This seems more consistent with an equitable inquiry
than an examination of the consistency of the fee with the attorney's effort.
Second, the court noted the special nature of contingent fee
contracts and, hence, the special role of the courts:
The strong judicial reluctance to enforce the terms of a judicially fashioned bargain upon the parties ... presses in favor
of honoring the express terms of the fe4 agreement [entered into
prior to litigation]. . .. We ... believe that the courts should
be loathe to intrude into a contractual relationship between an
attorney and client.76
That statement implies that a court should "intrude" into an attorney-client contractual relationship only when it has a special duty
to do so. In Dunn, one could easily argue that the acknowledged
obligation of Rule 23(e) was such a special duty. Notably, inherent in the rule's obligation to prevent abuse is an obligation to
assure ethical propriety in the course of a class action. Perhaps
most importantly, the Rule 23(e) duty may be analogized to a special policy consideration, similar to the protection of minors in
Cappel v. Adams,7 7 which compels judicial intervention into contingent fee arrangements by virtue of a court's equitable powers.
Thus, even in a case like Dunn, which seemingly supports the use
of a reasonableness standard, the ethical approach may be found
to have a basis.
APPLICATION OF THE ETHICAL APPROACH: AN
ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO A DIFFICULTk PROBLEM

III.

The merit in resorting to the ethical approach lies not only in
its doctrinal correctness and in the clarity resulting from its use,
but also in its ability to serve as an acceptable answer to difficult
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.at 1110.
Id.
Id. at 1111-12.
434 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1970). See notes 28-33 supra and accompanying text.
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problems. The Kent State case7 8 is an example of a case where the
ethical approach may provide a solution to confused and confusing doctrine. In that case, several wounded victims and parents of
deceased victims of the May 4, 1970 shootings at Kent State University retained counsel on a contingent fee basis and sought redress for their injuries. 7 9 The case proceeded through both state
and federal court systems on the issue of sovereign and official
immunity, eventually reaching the Ohio Supreme Court8" and the
United States Supreme Court." The initial federal trial on the
merits resulted in a verdict for the defendants. However, that verdict was later reversed and remanded.8 2
On January 4, 1979, four days into the second trial, the Kent'
State case was settled for $675,000 to be paid by the state of
Ohio.8 3 In expressly limiting the attorney fees to $50,000, the
court stated that the fees had to be fixed and the contracted contingent fees modified "in order to effect a settlement and to end
this litigation which seemed as if it would never end.'
Some dispute exists, however, concerning the justification
upon which the court based its order to set aside the contingent fee
contract.8 5 If the court did not modify the contract but rather set
86
an award pursuant to its authority under the Civil Rights Act,
the order may easily be justified by resort to a reasonableness
standard and a showing that the award satisfied the criterion of
economic fairness to the attorneys.8 7 However, if the court was
indeed passing on the propriety of the contract fee, then justification of the decision becomes problematic. Resort to a reasonableness standard in light of the court's desire to reach a settlement
and end litigation seemingly equates reasonableness with efficiency and expediency. Such a conclusion raises two problems.
First, deliberate (and ostensibly arbitrary) intervention into attor78. Krause v. Rhodes, No. 70-544 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 1979) (settlement and dismissal
order), appealdocketed, No. 79-3115 (6th Cir. March 9, 1979).
79. Memorandum of Trustee Re Allocation of Attorneys [sic] Fees and Costs from the
Settlement Fund, Krause v. Rhodes, No. 70-544 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 1979) 3-4.
80. Krause v. Rhodes, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1973).
81. Shauer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
82. Krause v. Rhodes, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,435 U.S. 924 (1978).
83. Krause v. Rhodes, No. 70-544 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 1979), appeal docketed, No.
79-3115 (6th Cir. 1979). The settlement also provided that a statement of regret would be
signed by all defendants. Id.
84. Id.at 7.
85. See notes 14-19 supra and accompanying text.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
87. See notes 49-55 supra and accompanying text.
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ney-client agreements is far removed from the special or exceptional circumstances usually thought to require judicial
involvement. 8 Second, such action apparently recognizes almost
unlimited power of the courts to modify contingent fee arrangements. Both of these difficulties would very likely discourage the
use of contingent fee contracts and thus preclude a significant avenue to legal recourse by the public.
Notably, resort to an ethical approach would rectify the difficulties presented by the reasonableness standard. Indeed, the district court appeared to have undertaken such an analysis when it
noted that "[t]here is a strong equitable justification for this
court's exercise of a limiting restraint upon the fees of an officer of
this court who would self-centeredly seek to deprive his clients of
the full sums which the State of Ohio has specifically reserved for
these plaintiffs."8 9 Significantly, under the ethical approach the
court could consider factors foreign to a reasonableness inquiry.
After nine years of litigation, victims of a tragic event could possibly have been prevented from attaining satisfaction of their claims
by one attorney. 90 Such circumstances seem to be squarely within
the scope of a court's power if articulated to be limited to an examination of the ethics of contingent fee agreements. Thus, by
using such an approach a court could redress wrongs in contingent
fee arrangements in a manner consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of its supervisory power and in a manner which sets a
straightforward standard by which attorneys could shape their activities, giving contingent fee mechanisms added usefulness and
cogency.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Contingent fee contracts receive special treatment. Because of
the risk that an attorney takes in entering into such agreements,
fees may be allowed that are greater than the market value of the
attorney's services. 9 1 Yet, such agreements, perhaps because of
88. See notes 26-33 supra and accompanying text.
89. Krause v. Rhodes No. 70-544 (N.D. Ohio March 9, 1979) (oral ruling) at 3.
90. The attorney who eventually sought review of the district court's attorney fees
ruling in the settlement and dismissal order did not conduct the appeal that resulted in a
new trial and "played no part in creating the settlement fund." Krause v. Rhodes, No.
70-544 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 6, 1979) (oral opinion) at 8. No other attorney appealed the
court's settlement and dismissal order to assert rights under the fee contracts. See id. at

9-10.
91. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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the potential windfall available to an attorney, are suspect. Although it seems clear that courts have the right to supervise contingent fee arrangements, 93 the proper scope of the power to
intervene must be somewhat limited in keeping with the special
nature of the court's power-to attain equity-and in order to
maintain the contingent fee arrangement as a viable and attractive
mechanism for financing legal action.
Many courts have developed standards of reviewing contingent fee contracts which have scrutinized the agreements in terms
of reasonableness. 94 This approach has several weaknesses. First,
it serves to confuse matters since courts have indiscriminately
used authority construing the reasonableness of statutorily authorized fee awards-an entirely and significantly distinct question-without an appreciation of the different nature of the
questions.9 5 Second, the reasonableness standard, by virtue of its
distance from any foundation in the equitable principles of a
court's supervisory power, may be used broadly to intervene
where the courts should not. Yet, for the same reason, the standard may be used to shield those arrangements where the court
should legitimately intervene.96
An alternative analysis looks to the ethical circumstances surrounding such arrangements. This approach not only obviates the
problems encountered with the reasonableness standard, 97 but is
in fact more consistent with the analysis used by some courts. 9 8
Further, the ethical approach appears to be of significant utility in
areas of current doctrinal difficulty and yet remains an analysis
which is consistent with the fundamental equitable principles of a
court's intervention power and which promotes the viability of the
contingent fee mechanism. 99
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